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abstract
This article outlines Francisco de Vitoria’s conception of natural law and natural right 
in an effort to amend a number of interpretations in the academic literature on his 
political and international thought that misapprehend Vitoria’s iusnaturalism. In 
this view, his use of the Thomist doctrine of natural law and justice lays the founda-
tion for his works on politics, society and international relations since the doctrine 
itself espouses equality and justice both within the domestic realm and between 
discrete communities. In an implicit appeal to the link between ethics and politics, 
his doctrine of natural law, moreover, fulfills a critical and constitutional role by 
designating justice and the common good as a pattern of order to which power and 
authority must conform in order to be legitimate. 
Keywords: F. de Vitoria, international relations, justice, natural right, 
power.
resumen
Se esboza la concepción de ley natural y derecho natural de Francisco de Vitoria con el 
fin de corregir varias de las interpretaciones de su pensamiento político e internacional 
que se encuentran en la literatura académica y que malentienden el iusnaturalismo 
de Vitoria. Se argumenta que la utilización que hace Vitoria de la doctrina tomista de 
ley y derecho natural constituye el fundamento de sus obras sobre política, sociedad 
y relaciones internacionales ya que dicha doctrina propugna la igualdad y la justicia 
tanto en el ámbito interno como entre comunidades distintas. Su doctrina sobre la 
ley natural apela implícitamente al vínculo entre ética y política y desempeña un 
papel crítico y constitucional al concebir la justicia y el bien común como un patrón 
de orden al que se deben conformar el poder y la autoridad para obtener legitimidad. 
Palabras clave: F. de Vitoria, relaciones internacionales, justicia, derecho 
natural, poder.
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Introductory Remarks
One of the most striking characteristics of some of the current lite-
rature that either directly addresses or touches upon the body of thought 
associated with Francisco de Vitoria and the School of Salamanca is the 
difficulty of fully comprehending its philosophical basis, the Thomistic 
conception of natural law as understood and applied by the Spanish theo-
logians of the sixteenth century. Much has been written on Francisco de 
Vitoria’s seminal work, Relectio de Indis (1539), and on how this contri-
buted, by way of his influence on Hugo Grotius,1 to the development of 
modern international law. It is also true that his work has been seen as 
justifying the aims and methods of the Spanish conquest in the Indies 
or, as in his political theory, as justifying monarchy as the only form 
of legitimate government. However, a careful examination of Vitoria’s 
natural law ethics, which expresses a conception of justice, of law, and 
of political community, as well as a universalist conception of interna-
tional relations, makes the latter suggestion untenable.
A principal concern of this article is that of offering an exposition 
of the basic tenets of Thomist natural law in accordance with the pers-
pective of early sixteenth century Spanish scholastic thought. Thomist 
iusnaturalism lies at the very foundation of Vitoria’s and his disciples’ 
political and legal thinking. Yet, a significant portion of the contempo-
rary literature addressing Spanish political thought during this period, 
with a few exceptions, glosses over or furnishes scant analysis of the 
meaning of this concept despite its being central to Vitoria’s thought. 
Even contemporary studies focusing principally on the natural law 
tradition (including those addressing the Thomist variant) eschew any 
systematic discussion of the contribution of Spanish scholastic thought 
to the development of the natural law tradition itself.2 In many such 
enquiries, Vitoria and his contemporaries are, at most, mentioned only 
in passing, despite their rich contribution to the literature on natural 
law ethics. By comparison, let us consider the assertions of a scholar 
who pondered the significance of Spanish moral philosophy three hun-
dred years ago. Hermann Conring, a seventeenth century jurist and 
Professor at the University of Helmstaedt, devotes a chapter to Spain in 
his Examen rerum publicarum potiorum totius orbis (An Examination of 
the Most Important Public Affairs of the World), and offers the following 
assessment of Vitoria’s Relectiones Theologicae and the development of 
moral philosophy in Spain: 
1 Spanish scholarship is generally more favorable to this assertion. See, for example, 
García Arias (1947), de Hinojosa (1919), Leger (1962), and Puig Peña (1934).
2 See Porter and Wolterstorff (2000), and McLean (2000).
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There is a work of his entitled Relectiones, which may be extraordi-
narily useful, not only for theologians, but also for jurisconsults, because 
it discusses moral topics with the greatest care and subtlety, wherefore 
I always read it with admiration […] Often I am surprised that Hugo 
Grotius was able to make progress in this kind of work so much greater 
than that ordinarily made by other authors. But his genius was curious. 
However, if he excelled in philosophy and produced the incomparable 
book, De jure belli ac pacis, he owed it to his reading of the Spanish juris-
consults, Ferdinand Vázquez and Diego Covarruvias, who in their turn 
made use of the work of their master, Franciscus de Victoria. He cites 
them frequently. Spanish legal science differed much from French legal 
science. In France we can praise only Cujas, Hotman, Bauduin, and others 
who have given their works a literary finish, but in Spain natural law is 
much better cultivated; there is indeed no other place where it is so hap-
pily taught. And all this Spain owes to Franciscus de Victoria. The same 
consideration applies to philosophy; it is moral philosophy that is most 
studied in that country. Let him who aspires to the most exact knowled-
ge of moral philosophy procure Spanish authors. Compared with the 
Spanish, the Germans and French are naught. It is for the reason pointed 
out by us that the Spanish have been so successful in the cultivation of 
metaphysics [...]. (qtd. in Nys 1917 98-99)
According to a scholar who wrote over seventy-five years ago, the 
scarce in-depth knowledge of Spanish thought in the areas of law, politics, 
and ethics can be explained by a “historical and systematic” prejudice 
that can be found, for example, in Julius Stahl’s work on the history of 
legal philosophy. Stahl systematically banished from the center of his 
attention thinkers whose works incorporated theology and included 
only those thinkers whose point of departure had been a philosophy 
of law understood as a science independent of theology and morality 
(cf. Riaza 1925 324-325).3 Historically, this partiality has also entailed, 
as Riaza says, an attempt to define legal philosophy as something that 
began with Hugo Grotius’s treatise of 1625, De iure belli ac pacis.
Although this matter is not the focus of this article, a few brief 
remarks are warranted. In addition to the problem of shirking the 
Spanish contribution to the development of natural law, there is the 
common positivist denial of human law as having some (divine) ethical 
basis from which legislation may be directed or guided. Urdánoz has 
seen this as an outcome of the intellectual ruminations of Protestant 
3 Riaza further remarks, however, that the works of the Spanish theologians do not forge 
a new legal science, but rather allow both theologian and lawyer to participate in the 
study of questions associated with legislation.
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theology and Enlightenment philosophy during the course of the six-
teenth and seventeenth centuries, whose advance is attributable to the 
pre-rationalism of Grotius, Thomasius, and Pufendorf (cf. Urdánoz 
1947 238). Grotius himself had initiated this departure from Scholastic 
natural law by drawing upon the voluntarist nominalism of Gabriel 
Biel (†1495) outlined a century earlier. Thus, based on an entirely em-
pirical criterion, natural law became the product of human natural 
reason in the absence of a metaphysical foundation. The articulation 
of law itself had become severed from religious influence and autho-
rity. Here, natural reason alone would be sufficient for establishing an 
autonomous conception of natural law (ibd.). Thus, from this approxi-
mate point in time, the development of natural law doctrines continued 
along the lines of a secularized variant, leaving the previous heritage, 
especially the so-called “Spanish School of Natural Law”, in a state of 
relative obscurity. 
The Concept of Natural Law in Aquinas and Vitoria
The concept of natural law in Aquinas is but one component of 
a hierarchical order of laws: the eternal law (lex aeterna), the natural 
law (lex naturalis) and its constituent part, natural right (ius naturale). 
Finally, below this hierarchy are the Divine and human laws (lex divi-
na et positiva). Generally speaking, the Thomist conception of law is 
so well known, particularly among theologians and legal philosophers, 
that one might question the need of setting forth its central tenets once 
again. However, the literature on Vitoria, as I have already suggested, 
exhibits significant oversights when attempting to explicate Vitoria’s 
natural law doctrine, if it ventures to do so at all. Serious interpretive 
problems also ensue when a number of scholars offer assessments of 
Vitoria’s university lectures, and, from my point of view, such diffi-
culties arise from not fully addressing the concept of natural law and 
discussing its connotations. Hence, the connection between ‘natural 
law’ and ‘natural right’ (and how these provide a basis upon which to 
establish a just political and legal order); the relationship between these 
two concepts and the Thomist conception of humans, their capacity to 
reason and to discern the principles of natural law; and the character 
of the law of nations (ius gentium) often remain obscured.
The following section is thus devoted to outlining two underlying 
themes present in Thomist natural law: man and political society. First is 
the question of the rational nature of humans as the basis of the political 
order. Unlike its Hobbesian counterpart, human beings are conceived in 
an optimistic sense (i.e. as rational creatures naturally inclined toward 
discovering the universal principles of morality). This involves a san-
guine epistemological assessment of their psychology. Thomism affirms 
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the operation of practical reason in humans as the primary mechanism 
for acquiring knowledge of good and the common good. 
Second, such a moral characterization of humans has implications 
for the political order. Essentially this means that their ethical and 
rational nature is asserted as the source of a system of laws whose funda-
mental purpose is the achievement of the common good. The common 
good, in turn, is seen, from the perspective of law, as a function of the 
articulation of the principles of justice by natural reason. The epistemo-
logical process describing the manner in which human beings acquire 
knowledge of moral principles is resolved into an assertion of their abi-
lity to discover the principles of justice that must, in this view, govern 
the political order through the legislation of just laws. The ontology of 
man thus involves the parallel theme of the nature of the state. Only a 
just state is a legitimate state. Hence, my overview will also address the 
concept of natural right, positive right, and justice.
The third section will discuss the general implications of this doc-
trine for the character of domestic and international society, inasmuch 
as justice is seen as the ordering principle of both realms. Specifically, I 
wish to underscore the critical and constitutional function of Thomist 
natural law in Vitoria, in the sense that its appeal to justice places 
ethical limits on the exercise of political power in domestic and inter-
national politics.
The Order of Reason in Man and the Basis  
of Political Society 
The Thomist concept of natural law is thoroughly embedded in a 
broad conceptualization of a universal order. The idea is Augustinian 
in origin and emphasizes the existence of a universal order governed 
by a divine reason and will (ratio divina vel voluntas Dei) (cf. Truyol 
y Serra 1989 264). Thus, St. Augustine incorporated Stoic metaphysi-
cal beliefs that asserted the existence of a divinity that had created all 
things according to their nature and to their corresponding ends. This 
teleological conception of nature further argues that the participation 
of humans in this divine logos defines their essential equality. No man 
is a slave by nature but rather by convention (cf. id. 179). Stoicism had 
provided a philosophical view of nature that, as Truyol has noted, 
allowed medieval theology to develop the Christian theory of eternal 
and natural laws. What St. Augustine had managed to forge, in this 
manner, was a theocentric conception of natural law that replaced the 
cosmological and pantheistic conception developed previously by the 
ancient Stoics (cf. id. 264). For St. Augustine, the eternal law is divine 
reason and will, and requires that human beings respect the natural 
order of things. In human conscience, this eternal law operates as 
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natural law, one which humans freely follow as rational beings able, as 
they are, to distinguish between good and evil, between the just and 
the unjust (cf. id. 264-265). These are a few of the background ideas 
that infused Thomist theology with the raw material necessary for the 
development of its own theological system and for the development of 
political and legal theory in later centuries.
Aquinas absorbed and further developed this notion of a universe 
directed and guided by the highest form of reason, that of the “first mo-
ver”, God. In his Summa Theologiae, eternal law is conceived as God’s 
wisdom directing all movement and action in creation; all creation is 
governed by this divine reason and destined to an end. In individuals, 
reason and will also have a purpose and an end but, unlike things 
belonging to external nature, men act freely as masters of their own 
conduct. Inasmuch as humans are endowed with reason, the definition 
of natural law as “nothing else than the rational creature’s participation 
in eternal law” (Fox 1910) underscores not only the essential dignity of 
humans, their ethical nature, but also the prescriptions they must follow 
in the ordering of social life, especially in the creation of law, seen as 
the rational (and ethical) consequence of human intellect. Specifically, 
participation in eternal law designates, as a Spanish theologian has 
noted, a reflection, albeit imperfect, of that divine reason in human 
beings (cf. Urdánoz 237). Therein lies his essential dignity and equality. 
The development of man’s ethical virtues remains in a state of potency, 
and it is intellect that which will allow him to unveil and discover the 
proper moral ordering of life. As a legal scholar has observed, that same 
reason inherent in man thus designates a “natural sphere of rational 
and ethical values” which finds expression in the notion of natural law and 
forms the basis for the realization and maintenance of the social 
and political order (cf. d’Entrèves 1939 21).
From the point of view of the individual, natural law is but a “rule 
of conduct which is prescribed to us by the Creator in the constitu-
tion of the nature with which He has endowed us” (Fox 1910). And this 
conduct may be said to be ‘natural’ in the sense that it is conceived as 
residing in the very nature of humans, who can discover it through 
reason (cf. ibd.). From the perspective of the social and political order, 
which Aquinas, following Aristotle, also considers natural, social and 
political institutions are seen as grounded in that very conception of 
the nature of man (cf. d’Entrèves 22). 
In this respect, Paul Sigmund’s general assessment of Aquinas’ poli-
tical and legal theory is correct in maintaining that Aquinas reasserts the 
value of politics because he sees politics and political life “as morally po-
sitive activities that are in accordance with the intention of God for man” 
(Sigmund 1993 217). A.P. d’Entrèves arrives at a virtually identical conclusion 
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when he emphasizes that the central concern of Aquinas’ political thought 
is that of “the nature and value of political experience” (d’Entrèvez 20).
The structure of that concern, one must bear in mind, has as its point of 
departure a definite (optimistic) conception of humans owing to their in-
nate capacity to reason which, among other things, allows their intellect 
to distinguish between right and wrong, between that which is just and 
that which is unjust (cf. Urdánoz 251). This ability to reason, Thomism 
maintains, underscores the dignity and exceptional character of humans 
above and beyond all other things in nature, and affirms their social and 
political character. The ethical ordering of that society and the nature and 
ends of its institutions are then deduced from the relationship among like 
men in political society. In sum, the ethical ordering and inclination of 
man’s rational nature (naturalis ratio) necessarily leads to the notion of a 
natural and ethical ordering of political society.
From this at least two questions follow. What principles characteri-
ze natural law and how may humans know them? What is the purpose 
and function of natural law for both society as a whole and for the in-
dividual? In this teleological conception of man and society, what are 
the ends that must be sought in the ordering of social and political life? 
In what follows, it should be noted that my purpose is not to establish 
whether the Thomist conception of natural law is acceptable or correct 
for modern scholars, nor to enter into a debate centering on the problems 
associated with the epistemology of Aquinas’ metaphysics, but merely 
to describe its principal tenets as a means of grasping the meaning and 
implications of Vitoria’s political writings.
Thomist Natural Law, its Principles  
and Cognoscibility: Practical Reason and Man’s 
Natural Inclination Towards the Good
One of the hallmarks of the Thomist conception of natural law 
is the existence of a set of self-evident principles discoverable by hu-
mans, and from which are derived their moral duties and obligations. 
Coleman’s explication of the cognoscibility of these self-evident prin-
ciples argues that
[Such principles] arise in us through the way we experience and 
think about the world. Hence, our logical ways of arguing and our ways 
of knowing what there is, rest on what is called metaphysical realism, a 
set of first principles, the truth of which humans cannot logically prove 
but which they accept as the starting point of whatever else they can lo-
gically prove. Indemonstrable propositions or first principles express the 
most basic, metaphysically immediate facts about reality for all humans. 
Because they are not specific to cultures, humans everywhere cannot fail 
to see their necessity and they are graspable by everyone. (2000 85)
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Sigmund has shown, furthermore, that the self-evident quality of 
such principles is based on an optimistic assumption regarding the na-
tural inclinations of the human intellect, viz. its propensity for rationally 
discovering the principles of morality and goals that are perceived by 
reason as good (cf. Sigmund 223). Fox has similarly summarized the 
essence of these principles in the following manner:
Starting from the premise that good is what primarily falls under 
the apprehension of the practical reason –that is of reason acting as the 
dictator of conduct– and that, consequently, the supreme principle of 
moral action must have good as its central idea, [Aquinas] holds that the 
supreme principle, from which all the other principles and precepts are 
derived, is that good is to be done, and evil avoided. (stq44 a2)
The previous statement contains a number of conceptual elements 
that may remain obscure to the inexperienced reader of Aquinas and 
require a degree of qualification and exegesis. Some of the contempo-
rary literature focusing on the Thomist conception of natural law, as 
utilized in the writings of the sixteenth century Spanish theologians, 
argues that from the “supreme principle” described above, Thomists 
deduced the primary principles of natural law; that, through a cogni-
tive process known as “synderesis”, human laws could be ultimately 
generated and codified; and that such laws also served to maintain an 
ethnocentric status quo harmful to indigenous society in the Indies.4 
Such summations of natural law, however, remain generally unclear as 
to the nature of the process by which such cognitive deductions that 
ultimately lead to the promulgation of law are possible (i.e. the nature 
of practical and speculative reason in man and how human reason itself 
may envision and, indeed, establish a “just” social order). This point 
is decisive because man’s rational capacity for the Thomists had ethi-
cal implications for the unfolding of individual and social pursuits. In 
other words, what remains substantially obscure in a number of dis-
cussions on natural law is the significance assigned to human reason 
in the ordering of political and social life, particularly as it pertains to 
the function and purpose of political authority in shaping the com-
mon good, when taken to the level of law and politics. A few remarks 
addressing the Thomist metaphysical conception of reason in man, 
particularly in its relation to the supreme principle of pursuing good 
and shunning evil, are thus warranted.
What is, then, the relationship between the conception of humans 
as rational creatures and their participation in the supreme principle 
of natural law, to do good and avoid evil? What are the implications of 
4 See, for example, Pagden and Lawrence (1991 xiv-xv), and Pagden (1994 159-160).
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this doctrine from the point of view of the ethical ordering of society? 
Indeed, how does the ontology of man necessarily lead to a particular 
view of the social order? Aquinas, in a fashion wholly reminiscent of 
the Aristotelian characterization of the logos (or rational principle) as 
divided into two parts, speaks of speculative and practical reason. In 
ST I q79 a12 of the Summa Theologicae man’s general capacity to rea-
son is described as:
[…] a kind of movement which begins with the understanding of 
certain things that are naturally known as immutable principles without in-
vestigation. It ends in the intellectual activity by which we make judgments 
on the basis of those principles that are naturally known in themselves 
concerning what has been discovered by reasoning. 
Speculative and practical reason operate on the basis of principles 
that are particular to each. Speculative reason, Aquinas tells us in re-
ference to Aristotle’s Ethics, is based on a disposition called habitus or 
“the understanding of principles” (Aquinas 1988 35). Practical reason, 
likewise, is not predicated upon a special power but by virtue of a na-
tural disposition called synderesis, or a capacity to apprehend general 
principles of morality (cf. id. 35-36). Aquinas asserts that, in matters 
concerning practical reason, the first thing that is grasped by humans 
in an absolute sense is the idea of their existence or being which esta-
blishes itself as a self-evident truth (st i-iiq94 a2); but this ontological 
truth, for Aquinas, is necessarily followed by a parallel notion of being 
in relation to its moral end, which is good.
Just as being is the first thing that is apprehended absolutely, good is 
the first thing apprehended by practical reason which is directed towards 
action, since everything that acts does so for an end which possesses the 
quality of goodness. Therefore, the first principle of practical reason is 
based on the nature of good, i.e. “Good is that which all things seek.” 
Hence, the first precept of law is that good is to be done and pursued, 
and evil is to be avoided. All the other precepts of the law of nature are 
based on this, so that all the things that are to be done or evils to be 
avoided belong to the precepts of the natural law which the practical 
reason naturally apprehends as human goods (cf. Aquinas 1988 49).
Thus, the order or sequence of the precepts of natural law closely 
follows the order of man’s natural inclinations or affinities. As Aquinas 
observes, there exists in human beings a natural inclination to good 
that they naturally share with “all substances, since every substance 
seeks to preserve itself according to its own nature” (1988 49). From this 
it follows that natural law embraces things that correspond to the pre-
servation of human life (as opposed to those that foster its destruction). 
There also exists in humans an inclination, directed at more particular 
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ends, that they share with other beings, such as the union of male and 
female and the education of their progeny. In similar fashion, man is 
also inclined toward the “good of the rational creature which is his 
alone”, and by which he is naturally inclined to learn about God and 
to live in society (id. 49-50).
This last point is of particular interest for it directs attention to 
Aquinas’ conviction, in following the pattern set by Aristotle, that 
man is meant for life among his fellow humans. Indeed, he received 
the Aristotelian notion of man as a political animal and transformed 
it into the idea of man as a political and social animal (cf. Ullmann 1988 
116), thereby deploying his theory of natural law within the context of 
society and politics. As Davis contends in his account of Thomist doc-
trine, God has created each species with internal properties natural to 
its kind. But for humans this means that their nature is not only physical 
but also rational and social, “and it is this that Thomas captures in the 
first principle of the natural law” when he argues that good should be 
pursued and evil avoided (cf. Davis 1997 489). It is, hence, not a moral 
principle as such, but a criterion for rational (human) action (cf. id. 479).5 
What becomes discernible, in any case, is the second element present 
in the Thomist and Vitoria’s conception of the lex naturalis. This refers 
to human beings’ inherent inclination toward good, especially as it per-
tains to their life within social order. The lex naturalis is, if one follows 
Davis’s terminology, a theory of rational action inasmuch as it concei-
ves humans as endowed not only with reason and freedom according 
to a divine plan, as well as with an innate potentiality to recognize and 
pursue certain ends in conformity with their nature, but also with the 
capacity to know, judge and achieve good both for themselves and for 
others, that is, as social beings.
Hence, the rational process by which the principles of natural law 
are apprehended is one that presupposes a natural and ethical inclina-
tion inherent in the very fabric of the human personality. The general 
tendency of intellection in humans, according to this doctrine, is concei-
ved as being directed essentially toward a recognition and apprehension 
of good, not merely in reference to oneself but, equally, in reference to 
society (and to the common good thereof), inasmuch as they are cogni-
zant of their ethical inclinations in relation to others within the context 
of a naturally existing social order. 
5 Davis further concludes: “The natural law is not a code of conduct so much as those 
judgments about what is and ought to be done as would be made by a person of practical 
reason who finds himself with the best available understanding of the way the world 
really is” (482). 
[50]
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The first set of self-evident principles, which are the product of spe-
culative reason and grounded in the metaphysical concept of “being” 
(cf. Truyol y Serra 1989 367-368), represents those that spring so directly 
from the supreme principle that they are deemed to possess universal 
validity because of their formal and general character (cf. id. 368). These 
include propositions such as “Do unto others as you would have others 
do unto you”, “Honor your parents”, or “Do not steal” (cf. Fox xv), and 
are judged to be necessary for a minimum moral order and are equally 
considered as possessing universal value (cf. Fox; Truyol y Serra 1989 
367). The secondary principles (which are the outcome of practical rea-
son), those that refer to the public and private good and which possess 
varying degrees of uncertainty,6 are seen as derived from a more difficult 
process of inference (cf. Fox). It is this difficulty, both Fox and Truyol 
agree, that requires that natural law be duly supplemented by human 
law (cf. Truyol y Serra 1989 368; Fox). Specifically, at the level of the ac-
tual social order, society itself cannot function on the basis of formal 
or abstract principles but must, instead, externalize such principles in 
a more definite and authoritative manner that takes into account the 
particular circumstances that characterize a particular cultural con-
text. This is the role of law in society.
Moreover, the universal and immutable character of natural law 
refers to its first principles and is anchored in an optimistic (and uni-
versal) assumption regarding the nature of man as an ethical being 
whose inclination is toward the achievement of good. The assumption 
of universality is predicated on the assertion that its fundamental, as 
opposed to its secondary, principles are inherent in the entire human 
species. These fundamental principles oblige humans to live according 
to their nature, guided by their rational character. The immutability 
of natural law is, likewise, predicated upon the notion of the nature of 
human beings, inasmuch as they are destined to an end in accordance 
with the precepts of the eternal law. It assumes the permanence of hu-
man nature, its continued existence, and thus commands and prohibits 
human action with the same force everywhere and throughout time (cf. 
Fox). Natural law is, in this view, mutable only in its secondary princi-
ples by way of either substraction or addition. In the former sense, this 
occurs only in special circumstances, when the matter to which those 
principles are applied has changed or ceased to be relevant, and only 
when the truthfulness or righteousness of what natural law prescribes 
6 Truyol thus notes that conclusions drawn from the sphere of speculative reason are of 
greater certainty than those conclusions arrived at in the sphere of practical reason. 
This is so, he argues, because practical reason is exercised in the domain of contingency 
characteristic of human action. Here, general principles become ever more uncertain 
inasmuch as they increasingly refer to the particular. See Truyol y Serra (368). 
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has not been altered (cf. Truyol y Serra 1989 368). More commonly, the 
natural law may change by way of addition given that, in time, new 
historical circumstances may require the generation and application 
of new secondary principles (cf. Sigmund 225-226). This is typically a 
function associated with the creation of positive laws.
Thomist Natural Law and Positive Human Law: 
Good as the Purpose of Law
According to Thomist doctrine, positive laws (ius civile) are seen 
as being grounded in the principles of natural law and only those laws 
that adhere to its tenets are considered valid and binding. Because hu-
man law is predicated upon the precepts of natural law, its articulation 
is primarily aimed at the achievement and maintenance of the common 
good (cf. Truyol y Serra 1989 369).7 Since it is concerned with the com-
mon good, human law is more restrictive in its range of application (as 
compared to the lex naturalis) because it is concerned only with those 
acts whose effects are socially far-reaching and directly shape the com-
mon good. And inasmuch as the “virtue of justice”, in the Aristotelian 
sense, is directly concerned with the common good, positive laws are 
seen as dealing primarily with justice (cf. Truyol y Serra 1989 369). In 
this view, law is the object of justice.8 This is substantially Vitoria’s (and 
Aquinas’) view of the function of law.9 Vitoria’s discussion of Aquinas’ 
arguments in ‘On the Effects of Law’ (sti-ii q92) includes an assertion 
to the effect that “the intention of the king is without doubt to make 
men good absolutely speaking and to direct them to virtue” (Padgen 
and Lawrence 166). Vitoria adds, “[t]he proof is, as Aquinas said and 
proved earlier (i-ii q90 a2), that the final purpose of law is the common 
good” (ibd.). The argument rests on the bases by which laws may be said 
to be legitimate. Following Aquinas, Vitoria thus argues:
That law is ordained to the common good may be understood in two 
ways: first de iure, because it should be so; and second de facto, not only 
because it should be so, but because if it were not so it would cease to be 
7 This assertion may be found in Aquinas’ Summary of Theology concerning the essence 
of law (q90 a2) and in Vitoria’s commentaries on Aquinas. For Vitoria’s observations 
on this question, see Padgen and Lawrence (157-158). 
8 Vitoria is clear on this point when discussing the essence of natural right (or ius naturale) 
and its relation to the Thomist notion of justice. I will outline the Thomist concept of 
justice below.
9 See Vitoria’s view on the nature of justice in his commentaries on Aquinas’ Summary 
of Theology, (see the section dealing with the ii-ii q57-61, De Iustitia) in the Latin ver-
sion: de Vitoria (1932). This edition covers all of Vitoria’s commentaries on Aquinas. 
Alternatively, one may refer to a Spanish language edition exclusively devoted to his 
commentaries on Aquinas’ conception of justice. See de Vitoria (2001).
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law. In the same way we speak of some things being necessary by pres-
cription, and others as being necessary in fact.
This being the case, we may reply that law is ordained for the com-
mon good in both senses. A prince may not invent a law which has no 
regard for the common good, since otherwise the law will be tyrannical, 
not just. The prince fulfills a public role which is itself ordained for the 
public good, and he is a servant of the commonwealth. A prince may of 
course look out for his own private good, but not through the law.
Second, I assert that a law cannot be against the common good, not 
only de iure, but also de facto, because in that case the law would be no 
law. If it were established that a law in no way concerned the common 
good, that law should not be obeyed. (id. 157)
The general emphasis that Thomist thought places on the common 
good as the end of the laws reveals once again the natural law basis of 
human social institutions. The legitimacy of laws and of institutional 
arrangements (including public authority) becomes a function of the 
extent to which they are predicated upon rational, ethical principles as 
expressed by the precepts of natural law. If the ontology of man implies 
a natural and essential inclination toward good within the context of the 
social order, such legal and political arrangements as are constructed 
must attempt to follow, and indeed foster, the same natural inclinations.
From this it follows that this conception of law also holds that, by 
virtue of its concern for the common good, such laws as are legislated 
must have a general character and proceed from a competent public 
authority whose concern is the articulation of the common good itself. 
But how are the laws to be derived, and by what means? Besides the ge-
neral assertion that laws must pursue the common good, what is the 
specific theory of law on the basis of which positive laws operate? To 
properly answer these questions, one must take into consideration and 
submit to analysis the Thomist assertion expressed above, viz. that law 
is the object of justice.
Natural Law and its Social Component:  
Ius Naturale and the Order of Justice
Natural law (lex naturalis) includes a narrower concept (ius natu-
rale or natural right), which refers exclusively to those principles that 
apply to man in the social order, to humans in their relationship with 
other men in an established commonwealth. Natural right, for the 
Thomists, is that part of the lex naturalis which regulates social life in 
its ordering toward the common good (cf. Urdánoz 237; Truyol y Serra 
1989 370). It is for this reason that Aquinas addresses natural right in 
his treatment of justice. The Thomist theory of law, which one may also 
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refer to, perhaps more appropriately, as a theory of right, establishes 
the existence of juridical norms (innate to man and thus considered 
universal) that inform natural reason. The task of the legislator, in this 
view, is to conform to such norms or principles when generating posi-
tive human laws (cf. Estébanez 459). In other words, legitimate positive 
laws are considered to be grounded in “right”, or the natural principles 
of justice knowable to the lawgiver.
Both Aquinas and Vitoria (again in his commentaries on Aquinas) 
address the concept of justice by first distinguishing the latter from 
the other Aristotelian virtues. The principal difference lies in two fun-
damental characteristics. The first is that the virtue of justice, unlike 
other virtues, which are oriented toward oneself, is always directed at 
someone other than the agent of justice. This quality (alterity), the refe-
rence to the other, stems from its second characteristic, equality (drawn 
from the Aristotelian concept of epieikeia). Vitoria explained this by 
emphasizing that when we articulate justice, or “the just”, we are not 
acquiring something for ourselves but rather giving someone else his 
due. “The just”, he explained, is the same as “equal”, and the “equal” is 
in respect of someone else, or in relation to someone else. One never 
says, he added, that something is equal to itself but rather equal to some- 
thing else. Therefore, justice is necessarily in relation to someone else.10 
This notion of equality thus implied the corresponding notion of debit 
or the idea of giving to each his due. 
Vitoria drew upon Roman legal texts to illustrate this point. 
Ulpian (†228), he noted, referred to the concept of justice as the firm 
and constant determination to confer to each his due (firma et cons-
tans voluntas jus suum uni cuique trubuens) and noted that Franciscus 
Accursius (†1263) had restated Ulpian’s definition (cf. Vitoria 2001 9). 
This conceptualization of justice follows Aristotle’s notion of “particu-
lar” justice, which, as Barker has shown, “is concerned with the specific 
form of goodness which consists in behaving ‘fairly’ […] or ‘equally’, to 
other men” (Aristotle 1946 362).11 The conception of the common good 
thus implies a conception of justice (or right), which, in turn, involves 
the articulation of the idea of equality, inasmuch as it is developed and 
expressed in a juridical sense, among members of society. “Justice in 
general, then, is concerned,” as Coleman notes, 
with the due measure of right external acts, giving what is due to 
another […] Given that one’s own good must take place within common 
fulfillment, the civitas as the perfect community is the setting in which 
10 See q57 a1 in Vitoria (2001 5). 
11 As in Aristotle, the notion also includes the idea of distributive and commutative justice. 
Here, I will focus only on the former.
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one comes to have an interest in good of others of the species for their 
own sake and as members of the species (97).
Justice is, in sum, a social concept; and society, in this view, must 
embody in its actual ethical development the principles emanating 
from justice itself.
Natural and Positive Right: The “Just” by Nature  
and by Determination
This theory of “right” is conceptually divided into two distinct but 
complementary parts. The first, “natural right”, refers to that which is 
just by virtue of the nature of the “object” in question (and this may 
refer to a broad range of human relationships). The second element, 
“positive right”, refers to that which is just by virtue of a public or pri-
vate compact, as in the enactment of a law or the signing of a contract 
between private parties. In the first sense, the “just” is realized by the 
very nature of the phenomenon; in the second sense, by human volition 
(cf. Truyol y Serra 1989 370). Vitoria illustrated the concepts of natural 
and positive right by stating, first, that in the former sense, “the just” is 
that which by its very nature is marked by equality. If I receive a depo-
sit of one hundred ducats, he argued, I am obliged to return the same 
deposit to its rightful owner (cf. Vitoria 2001 14). This is by its very na-
ture just and equal and suited to the other. In this fashion, it is also just 
that a father should rear his son and that the son should obey his father. 
“May this be the first conclusion: in this sense that which is just by its 
very nature is called natural right” (Vitoria 2001 14). Alternatively, that 
which is “just” is the result of a determination made by either law or 
private covenant and not by its nature. What one must pay for a horse or 
a house, he argued, or the wages one receives for a day’s work is some- 
thing not determined by its nature but by agreement. He thus arrived at 
his second conclusion, viz. that “the just” in this second sense is called 
“positive or human right” (ibd.). This, he concluded, is called law. 
At this point, it is essential to say something about the cognitive 
process by which the “just” is apprehended and laws generated. As I 
have noted above, natural right describes the juridical principles that 
inform human reason (cf. Estébanez 463).12 From this it follows that 
human reason must exercise a method by which said principles (of the 
“just”) are understood and then translated into effective legal com-
mands or edicts. The derivation of laws, according to this view, may 
12 Here I closely follow the line of reasoning offered by Father Estébanez in his introduction 
to the Spanish-language edition of Aquinas’ Summary of Theology, especially questions 
57 to 60 as they refer to the notion of justice.
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take place through two methods. The first allows the agent (e.g. the le-
gislator) to locate and identify natural principles of justice through the 
exercise of natural reason (here, we move within the realm of “natural 
right”), while the second allows the translation of such principles into 
law (here, we reach the realm of “positive right”). 
This first method is logical derivation. By this method, the “just” 
may be determined in a twofold fashion. First, absolutely, that is by 
logically deducing conclusions from principles. For example, the pro-
position that “one must not harm anyone” is derived from a prior 
principle, considered to be absolute and self-evident in this view: “one 
must not kill” (cf. Estébanez 460-463). Second, logical derivation may 
be exercised not only “absolutely” but also by referring or comparing 
“the just” to the consequences arising from its concrete application. As 
Estébanez maintains, Aquinas includes in the concept of natural right 
both the identification of its principles as well as the conclusions logi-
cally stemming from those very same principles.13 For example, while 
Aquinas did not believe that men are by nature, or in essence, slaves it 
may nonetheless be that under certain circumstances such servitude 
may be beneficial to a number of men because they simply are better 
suited for certain tasks than for others (e.g. manual labor rather than 
governance). It then might be just for certain men to engage in slavery 
if, through such a condition, greater evils or harm are avoided (cf. 
Estébanez 464). Secondly, the resulting derivation of laws takes place by 
determination (cf. Estébanez 465). This basically involves selecting from 
a range of possibilities and, in accordance with the needs of a histori-
cally particular social context, a future legal command through which 
a particular principle of “the just” is concretely applied. Estébanez, in 
illustrating this principle, notes that the natural precept which com-
mands that a criminal should be punished may be realized through a 
variety of legal commands: death penalty, imprisonment, fines, and so 
on. Human law, however, must determine which specific sanction is 
appropriate (cf. Estébanez 465-467).
Positive human laws, in this light, are not their own autonomous 
source of law but rather “only the application or practical synthesis of 
natural right” (Estébanez 460).14 Neither is positive right in contradic-
tion with natural right; instead, they form a single, ethical conception of 
law based on principles of justice. And it is for this reason that Aquinas 
(stii-ii q57 a1) and Vitoria stress the notion that law is the object of 
justice (cf. Estébanez 459; Vitoria 2001 9). It is important to note that in 
13 Vitoria explains this in a virtually identical fashion in his discussion of “degrees” of 
natural right. See Vitoria (2001 17-19). 
14 The translation is mine.
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this Thomist understanding of human law, law itself is not the same as 
“right” although it is closely related to it. Actual law is understood as 
the rule and measure, and rational external expression, of “right” (cf. 
Vitoria 2001 9).15 Donnelly thus rightly observes that for Aquinas “law is 
the written expression of right […]” (Donnelly 529). The arena of “right” 
is merely the intellectual framework from which actual laws emerge. 
Here, the legislator’s rational operation of cognition allows him to ap-
prehend “the just” in its first self-evident, and absolute, principles –to 
grasp what is “naturally” right– as well as to assign to those principles 
the logical conclusions which ought to thereby take the form of a posi-
tive right that is in harmony with its corresponding natural principles. 
Estébanez has further observed that the ius naturale, from its primary 
principles down to its logically derived conclusions, is abstract, formal, 
inoperative, and requires institutional objectification whereby it may 
become posited as a concrete legal command (cf. 465). 
Moreover, one may further describe another aspect inherent in 
the derivation of law from the ius naturale: that such legislation as is 
enacted may also be a function of consensus. Given the fact that a so-
cial group must observe the legislation, the process of determination 
presupposes the consent of all interested parties (as when we speak of 
states agreeing upon particular laws regulating inter-state activities) 
(cf. Estébanez 466). It is this consensus that marks the essential differ-
ence between natural and positive right (cf. ibd.). It is necessary to add, 
however, that it is not this consensus per se which makes positive le-
gal commands just. What is agreed, legally expressed and posited at 
any given moment of promulgation is but one of a number of possible 
legal commands whose source, when just, is traceable to the ius natu-
rale (cf. ibd.). The act of legislating, of determining legal sanctions, is 
not conceived as an arbitrary act; it, too, must abide by the dictates of 
natural reason (cf. ibd.). The naturalis ratio of the legislator must be 
enriched by historical experience, and by the political prudence and 
maturity acquired through personal experience itself (cf. Urdánoz 270). 
Skinner has made an important observation on the relevance of 
consensus in his discussion centering on the Spanish Thomists. Such a 
notion reflected the theologians’ concern for the legitimacy of govern-
ment inasmuch as said legitimacy found its source in a correspondence 
between positive law and natural right. “[The Thomists] all assume”, 
Skinner observes, “that the question of whether an established system 
of government is juridically valid is not a question about consent, but 
simply a question about whether the government’s enactments are 
15 In his commentaries on Aquinas’ treatise on law (i-ii q90 a1) Vitoria emphasizes again 
that “law is a function of reason”. See Pagden and Lawrence (155). 
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congruent with the laws of nature” (Skinner 162-163). Hence the corres-
ponding Thomist assertion that only just laws are truly laws. Only a 
just political society can be a legitimate one. In such a view, one shared 
by Vitoria and his fellow theologians of the School of Salamanca, state 
and society are seen as a collection of individuals brought into unity 
by law; but the essence of the state, and its legitimacy, are to be found 
in the articulation of justice itself (cf. Naszalyi 45). 
Thomist Natural Law and its Implications
The path I have pursued in this account of the Thomist doctrine 
of natural law is one that highlights a number of theological concepts 
associated with the notion of a rational and just social and political or-
der. Many of these fundamental ideas, as old as they are, are often not 
properly interpreted or fully addressed when analyzing the theological 
and juristic discourse set forth in Vitoria’s political writings. This sum-
mary of the Thomist concept of natural law has sought to provide the 
reader with an explanation of the latter, in order to avoid the concep-
tual pitfalls characteristic of some of the critical literature on Vitoria.
Justice as the Ordering Principle of Domestic  
and International Societies
A central theme always present in Vitoria’s thought and in the 
Thomist mind when discussing the order of society, and which is equally 
deployed when discussing state governance and international relations, is 
the concept of justice (iustitia). The idea of justice, in this perspective, is 
developed in connection with the notion of the character of man. Indeed, 
the fundamental building block of the social order is man himself, or 
more specifically, the rational nature of man inclined as it is, by virtue of 
this assumption, toward good. From this proposition, it was possible to 
construct an entire legal and political philosophy devoted to outlining 
the ethical basis of a community’s social and political institutions. For 
Aquinas and his Spanish followers, the rational character of humans, 
which separates them from other forms of organic life, is expressed in 
the enactment of laws (especially just laws) that are the product not so 
much of human will as they are of human reason (cf. d’Entrèves 22). 
This point is pivotal, because, on the one hand, the acceptance of this 
doctrine, as d’Entrèves has observed, has expressed ever since then the 
fundamental tension between the “intellectualistic” and “voluntarist” 
theory of law (cf. ibd.). D’Entrèves further notes:
But above all, it explains [Aquinas’] attitude toward the problem of 
political obligation, and his acceptance of a theory, like that of Aristotle, 
which involved a rational explanation of the state and attributed a positive 
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value to social and political institutions, as being grounded in the very 
nature of man. (22)
Earlier in this discussion I posed a question concerning the impli-
cations of the doctrine of the law of nature for the conception of man 
and for the relationship between man and society. The answer, I believe, 
is that the pursuit of the “good” of the individual, and of the “common 
good” and the establishment of justice in the social order, are ideals that 
unite the individual and society, the state and the surrounding civility, 
in a single fabric of moral life. Such unity implies an optimistic con-
ception of man and of human rationality in the order of creation. And 
it must equally assume, as an ideal, that the interests of the state and 
of the individual are in harmony. This is a trait that separates Vitoria’s 
political thought from, for example, Thomas Hobbes’ conception of 
the social order and of political power. Hobbes’ Leviathan, freed from 
the ethical restraints of universal principles, becomes the sole bearer 
of power and the sole source of law. This philosophy, made possible by 
the philosophic ruminations on a “state of nature” in which men are in 
a constant state of war against one another, and which hence required 
the emergence of an awe-inspiring power whose task was the main-
tenance of a troubled peace in a passion-filled order, parted company 
with previous universalist, both Catholic and pagan, philosophies and 
metaphysics. Man and society, in order to survive, only required a ro-
bust and over-powering authority in a world marked by moral poverty.
As opposed to such natural law theories that define man in pessi-
mistic terms, the optimistic conception of man embodied in Vitoria’s 
Thomist iusnaturalism and the teleological dimension connected to 
man’s ontological status is posed as a point of departure for under-
standing the ends of society and the function and purpose of political 
authority. The human ability to reason is the primary indication of 
man’s status in society. It implies the essential equality and dignity of 
all humans and, in doing so, defines the limits of political power in the 
relationship between political authority and the individual. In that re-
lationship, the role of the state is to foster human flourishing individually 
and collectively. Men, indeed, must obey the state and its laws but those 
laws cannot be set against the individual; they cannot be rational if 
they are oriented toward his injury. The integration of individuals into 
a wider community, moreover, does not imply the annihilation of their 
individuality; the value of the whole does not diminish the value of its 
parts. This is necessarily the case because, in this view, the ends of the 
individual and of the state are substantially the same. “The integration 
of the individual in the whole,” d’Entrèves holds, “must be conceived of 
as an enlargement and an enrichment of the human personality, not as 
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a degradation of the individual to the mere function of a part with no 
value of its own” (cf. 28). The state serves rather as a means for the achiev- 
 ement of a higher end (cf. d’Entrèves 29). The role of the state, in this 
view, is closely linked to the idea of the common good and individual 
human flourishing; and the common good itself, from the perspective 
of civil society, is substantially linked to the maintenance of justice. The 
state may not thus legitimately enact laws that foster the destruction 
or degradation of human life, nor may it exempt itself from following 
the laws of nature and the principles of justice that are inherent in it.
However, when this is the case, when justice as a pattern for the 
ordering of political and social life is abandoned, natural law may as-
sume a critical function. Neumann summarizes this aspect of natural 
law in the following manner:
If every doctrine of Natural Law is based upon man as an individual, 
either autonomous or subject to the lawfulness of external nature, then 
man must be considered as a rational individual. That in turn implies 
the recognition of the essential equality of human beings. And this again 
leads to the universality of the Natural Law doctrine which is the central 
view common to all doctrines. It also follows that no theory of Natural 
Law can accept facts as they are and because they are. Natural law is thus 
fundamentally opposed to traditionalism and historicism. Each human 
institution is open to critical reason, none is exempt from it. (Neumann 80)
While indeed it is generally agreed that Thomist natural law is an 
essentially conservative doctrine, “a kind of codification of the feudal 
order” that does not assume revolutionary overtones, as Neumann and 
others have held, this assertion focuses on merely one facet of the doc-
trine. Following Gierke on this matter, Neumann further maintains:
To see Thomism as a kind of ideology intended to cover feudal exploi-
tation with the cloak of an eternally valid law is to present but one aspect 
of the system […] The recognition of man as a rational creature means that 
“every individual is by virtue of his eternal destination at the core whol- 
ly indestructible even in relation to the Highest Power.” (Neumann 82)
Thus, despite the apparently conservative character of Thomism 
generally speaking, it is nonetheless true (and herein lay the value of 
Vitoria and the School of Salamanca) that its tenets well served the 
intentions of the Spanish theologians when attempting to find a more 
secular basis for defining the nature of international community, es-
pecially when considering the status of non-Christian peoples. The 
intellectual resources necessary for this task where already present in 
Aquinas. According to Aquinas’ restatement of Aristotelian philoso-
phy, if the state and its social and political institutions are derived from 
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the very nature of man, if indeed they are part of a natural morality 
because all men can know the operations of natural law, then these 
very institutions could also be justified as existing on a purely human 
plane, “independently of religious values, which do not alter the natural 
order of which the state is a necessary expression” (d’Entrèvez 23-24). 
“This implies,” d’Entrèves further notes, “that even a non-Christian or 
pagan state is endowed with a positive value, as against St. Augustine’s 
conception of the pagan state as the embodiment of the civitas terrena, 
and the work of sin” (ibd.).
What Aquinas and Vitoria achieved was a clear distinction between 
the spiritual and temporal orders. This view of public (and private) autho-
rity as having a natural law basis, if extended to the realm of inter-state 
relations, meant that the principles of the just war doctrine pertaining 
to conflicts between Christian states could be equally applied to the re-
lations between Christian and non-Christians (cf. Truyol y Serra 1993 
22). This decisive view made possible the conception of a universal in-
ternational juridical order valid for all human societies, and became the 
framework from which Vitoria outlined his internationalist outlook. 
The Constitutional Function of Natural Right
That very internationalist view meant that the prior medieval notion 
of an orbis christianus had been wholly supplanted by a communitas or-
bis predicated upon the principles of natural right (cf. Belda Plans 44). 
Hence the ius gentium, which Vitoria understood, in sum, as both the 
Roman concept of a law among nations as well as a law between discrete 
political communities (ius inter gentes), was not merely of natural right 
but also required, by way of international agreement or compact, the 
articulation of just positive laws to which all communities are bound 
(cf. Fernández-Santamaría 1977 98-100; Truyol y Serra 1993 24). This 
“natural” conception of a world community stemming from the same 
Thomist natural law theory of political society provided Vitoria with 
the elements necessary not only to establish an early structure of a fully 
secular international law more systematically developed by later thinkers 
(e.g. Gentili and Grotius), but also to deploy the notion of natural right as 
a critical tool limiting the exercise of Spanish power in the New World. 
Here again the entire basis of such assertions is the natural law view 
of the rational character of man. If men are essentially equal by virtue 
of their capacity of reason, and if they can create societies that ratio-
nally enact just laws, then their societies, in their mutual relations and 
bound by the principles of natural and positive justice, are juridically 
equal as well (cf. Truyol y Sierra 1993 24). This notion of equality and 
justice based on a prior notion of man allowed Vitoria to maintain that 
neither Imperial nor Papal authority could exercise jurisdiction over the 
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Indies nor could these communities be deprived of their resources or 
goods, for the latter by natural right, Vitoria had argued, exercised true 
dominion over their communities. It was only on grounds of violations 
of justice that limited intervention could be exercised.16 His lecture De 
Indis (1539) established that dominion is a function of reason, that only 
rational creatures may possess dominion and, having noted the social 
ordering of indigenous communities as being governed by the exer- 
cise of reason, he concluded that before the arrival of the Spaniards 
“the barbarians undoubtedly possessed true dominion, both public and 
private, as any Christians” (Pagden and Lawrence 247-251). Thus, what 
began as an ostensibly conservative medieval doctrine was transformed 
by Vitoria into a critical tool with a constitutional function that de- 
fined and limited the exercise of power in accordance with the Thomist 
conception of justice and natural right. Truyol has similarly argued, 
When his nation reached the peak of its power, Vitoria sought to 
confound the temptations of power thus proclaiming its subservience to 
moral law […] His was a vision that sought to guide power rather than 
follow in its footsteps; and to direct power toward the fulfillment of its 
natural ends rather than toward a justification of its illicit aims. (Truyol 
y Sierra 1946 20)17
 In the arena of international politics, this meant developing a robust 
system of authoritative ethical and legal constraints to which states could 
theoretically be subjected. In this sense, perhaps his most noteworthy 
achievement, in an age in which Italian princes had begun to glorify the 
idea of ragione di stato thus instating the tradition of modern realpolitik, 
was that of rigorously formulating the principles of justice upon which 
international relations could be predicated in times of conflict (cf. De 
Hinojosa 1946 33). That his attempts to provide an ethical conception 
of international order met with failure in practice does not destroy the 
merits of his thought, but rather merely demonstrates that the struggle 
for such ideals as peace and justice in international affairs has been an 
unrelenting effort. That his concerns in this regard are very similar to 
those shared by many today reveals the continued relevance and vita-
lity of his thought. This forces us to link contemporary political and 
ethical speculation in matters of justice to its fathers in the world of the 
European Renaissance.
16 For an account of this, see Valenzuela-Vermehren (2013).
17 The translation is mine.
[62]
departamento de filosofía • facultad de ciencias humanas • universidad nacional de colombia
Luis Valenzuela-Vermehren
Summary
The fundamental building block of Thomist natural law in Vitoria 
is the conception of the rational character of man. His rationality not 
only points to his essential dignity above and beyond all other things of 
external nature but also designates his capacity to apprehend the funda-
mental principles of morality and justice that form the basis of society 
and its political institutions. This brand of natural law establishes that 
by their very rational nature, as Aquinas had argued, all men are born 
free and are equal in essence. Such equality, when taken onto the plane 
of domestic society, holds that justice is the foundation of the political 
order, for only through a just, and therefore legitimate, order may the 
common good, the aim of law, be achieved.
This notion is extended by Vitoria to the realm of international re-
lations in his conception of the ius gentium. What natural reason has 
established among and between all peoples is the primary definition 
of the law of nations offered by him. But the latter also finds positive, 
binding external expression in custom and pacts. Again, the principle 
underlying this conception is the concept of justice, which, in asserting 
the essential equality of all men, equally asserts the equal juridical stan-
ding between political communities in international relations.
Finally, Vitoria’s conception of natural law, both in the domestic 
and international spheres, assumes a critical and constitutional function 
by establishing justice as a pattern of order by which political power 
and authority must abide if it is to be legitimate. Vitoria’s vision of po-
litical life, in this manner, maintains an essential link between ethics 
and politics inasmuch as justice is the fundamental source of human 
flourishing within and between political communities.
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